Jaramillo, M. y Bardález, E. (2019). Democracia y gobiernos locales: efectos de la divergencia entre la voluntad popular y la distribución del poder en los gobiernos municipales. Lima: GRADE. Documentos de Investigación, 91.

In Peru, mayors in a large number of municipalities are elected with a small electoral base. However, in the distribution of the number of seats in the municipal council, the “majority premium” rule is applied, which creates a divergence between the distribution of power and popular support: a mayor with little support in his election can control a good part of the power in the council.

This research analyzes a potential source of the institutional weakness of local governments: the rule of power allocation within municipalities. Quantitative research finds that majority rule is associated with a higher probability of recall of both the mayor and his or her aldermen, as well as a lower probability of mayoral re-election. On the other hand, although there is a negative relationship between the probability of reelection and the electoral rule, it is low. Qualitative evidence shows that, in a very heterogeneous context, the rule does not necessarily facilitate municipal management and, in combination with local factors, enables the emergence of anti-democratic aspects of political dynamics. Thus, it shapes a governance structure that enhances discretionality and vitiates the conditions for political dialogue.